In recent days, we’ve looked at the “Liberaltarianizing” of the United States, and how Americans seem to be too quick to trade their freedom for safety. In what is a third part of an unintended series, we focus on foreign policy and how that affects both of the previous topics. The Obama administration as made a big hullabaloo over the use of “Smart Power” in international relations (I would argue that Obama “Smart Power” is a repackaging of “Soft Power“, with an over-reliance of soft power strategies, while generally eschewing “Hard Power”). Under the guise of “restoring America’s standing,” one could argue that the ultimate result of the Obama strategy is to reduce the United States’ international hegemony, making America “just another country” in the world stage.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that such an approach would do nothing other than to increase unrest around the globe, thereby decreasing the safety so coveted by “liberaltarians.” Nature abhors a vacuum, and in a world without a dominant United States presence, the leadership vacuum is being filled by what Robert Kaplan terms Anarchy. This is borne out historically in an example provided by Kaplan:
The problem is, however, that in geopolitics equality usually does not work very well. For centuries Europe had a rough equality between major states that is often referred to as the balance-of-power system. And that led to frequent wars. East Asia, by contrast, from the 14th to the early 19th centuries, had its relations ordered by a tribute system in which China was roughly dominant. The result, according to political scientist David C. Kang of the University of Southern California, was a generally more peaceful climate in Asia than in Europe.
The fact is that domination of one sort or another, tyrannical or not, has a better chance of preventing the outbreak of war than a system in which no one is really in charge; where no one is the top dog, so to speak. That is why Columbia University’s Kenneth Waltz, arguably America’s pre-eminent realist, says that the opposite of “anarchy” is not stability, but “hierarchy.”
Of course, leftists would bristle at the notion that one country should be “more equal” than others, or that this source of inequality is the thing that creates international stability and peace. Since the end of World War II (especially) the role of international hegemon has been filled by the United States, inasmuch as America emerged as the dominant world power, and through a general consensus, was expected to lead on the world stage. When the hegemon fails to lead (or “leads from behind”) it is betraying its agreed-upon position, and can be said to be acting irresponsibly. However, as Kaplan continues:
Of course, hegemony has a bad reputation in media discourse. But that is only because journalists are confused about the terminology, even as they sanctimoniously judge previous historical eras by the strict standards of their own. In fact, for most of human history, periods of relative peace have been the product of hegemony of one sort or another. And for many periods, the reigning hegemonic or imperial power was the most liberal, according to the standards of the age. Rome, Venice and Britain were usually more liberal than the forces arranged against them. The empire of the Austrian Hapsburgs in Central and Eastern Europe often protected the rights of minorities and prevented ethnic wars to a much greater degree than did the modern states that succeeded it. The Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Middle East frequently did likewise. There are exceptions, of course, like Hapsburg Spain, with its combination of inquisition and conquest. But the point is that hegemony does not require tyrannical or absolutist rule.
Stability is not the natural order of things. In fact, history shows that stability such as it exists is usually a function of imperial rule, which, in turn, is a common form of hierarchy. To wit, there are few things messier in geopolitics than the demise of an empire. The collapse of the Hapsburgs, of the Ottoman Turks, of the Soviet Empire and the British Empire in Asia and Africa led to chronic wars and upheavals. Some uncomprehending commentators remind us that all empires end badly. Of course they do, but that is only after they have provided decades and centuries of relative peace.
Obviously, not all empires are morally equivalent. For example, the Austrian Hapsburgs were for their time infinitely more tolerant than the Soviet Communists. Indeed, had the Romanov Dynasty in St. Petersburg not been replaced in 1917 by Lenin’s Bolsheviks, Russia would likely have evolved far more humanely than it did through the course of the 20th century. Therefore, I am saying only in a general sense is order preferable to disorder. (Though captivating subtleties abound: For example, Napoleon betrayed the ideals of the French Revolution by creating an empire, but he also granted rights to Jews and Protestants and created a system of merit over one of just birth and privilege.)
In any case, such order must come from hierarchal [sic] domination.
However, as I alluded to above, these days seem to be behind us; not only is a hegemonic role for the United States antithetical to Obama’s world view and political philosophy, but after two lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans in general seem to have a case of battle-fatigue. Obama’s strategy is playing directly into it: outside of some special-ops personnel to carry out surgical drone-strikes on individuals, there is a reluctance to put “boots on the ground” to right wrongs in places such as Libya, Syria. Granted, since Korea, presidents in general have been reluctant to use force; it wasn’t until George W. Bush after 9/11 (and to a lesser extent, George H.W. Bush in Kuwait) that U.S. force was employed en masse. However, Obama seems to have accelerated a shift:
In a world of strong states — a world characterized by hierarchy, that is — the United States often enforced the rules of the road or competed with another hegemon, the Soviet Union, to do so. Such enforcement came in the form of robust diplomacy, often backed by a threat to use military power. Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were noted for American leadership and an effective, sometimes ruthless foreign policy. Since the Cold War ended and Bill Clinton became president, American leadership has often seemed to be either unserious, inexpertly and crudely applied or relatively absent. And this has transpired even as states themselves in the Greater Middle East have become feebler.
In other words, both the hegemon and the many states it influences are weaker. Hierarchy is dissolving on all levels. [emphasis mine]
Thus, the exact kind of international policies that “liberaltarians” are asking for in order to preserve their ability to safely exercise their personal pleasure license could be creating the conditions that directly threaten that safety. As we’ve noted, as safety is threatened, Americans are tending to not think twice about giving up their liberty to the state in order to protect them (again, from the situations they’re directly creating. Of course, in an imperial presidency, the surrender of freedom is not a problem and is even welcomed. However, to those that value our civil and political liberty, it is increasingly problematic. As Kaplan concludes:
Unless some force can, against considerable odds, reinstitute hierarchy — be it an American hegemon acting globally, or an international organization acting regionally or, say, an Egyptian military acting internally — we will have more fluidity, more equality and therefore more anarchy to look forward to. This is profoundly disturbing, because civilization abjures anarchy.
“Anarchy and Hegemony is republished with permission of Stratfor.”